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Illusions have become an invaluable tool
for investigating how the sense of a body
as one’s own is constructed and main-
tained: During the rubber hand illusion
(RHI, Botvinick and Cohen, 1998), con-
gruent touch to one’s hidden hand and a
fake counterpart produces an illusion of
feeling the touch on the fake hand and,
more strikingly, an experience of the fake
hand as part of one’s body (Ehrsson et al.,
2004; Tsakiris, 2010). The principles of
the RHI paradigm have been extended
to various body parts (Petkova et al.,
2011), including even the face (Tsakiris,
2008; Apps et al., 2013); most notably,
the RHI has been induced for the entire
body (full body illusion, FBI), producing
similar behavioral and neural responses
(anxiety responses, ownership of the fake
body, misperception of one’s physical loca-
tion; Ehrsson, 2007; Lenggenhager et al.,
2007; Maselli and Slater, 2013). Such
body ownership illusions (BOIs) have gen-
erated a substantial amount of research
and invaluable insights into the mecha-
nisms of body ownership (Tsakiris, 2010;
Blanke, 2012; Moseley et al., 2012). The
special importance of these illusions lies
in the fact that what they manipulate—
the sense of having a body—is one of
the enabling conditions of minimal phe-
nomenal selfhood (MPS, Gallagher, 2000;
Blanke and Metzinger, 2009; Metzinger,
2013a). MPS is defined as the most basic
possible kind of self-consciousness or self-
awareness (Blanke and Metzinger, 2009;
Gallagher and Zahavi, 2010), and investi-
gating its enabling conditions may help us
understand what it takes for an organism
to have the experience of being a self.
Nevertheless, in this paper I will argue
that it is still unclear what exactly the
mechanisms revealed by BOIs tell us about
MPS, and that this needs to be clari-
fied via a joint effort of phenomeno-
logical analysis and formal accounts of
self-modeling.
BOIs rest on the induction of some
crossmodal conflict (e.g., touch seen on
a fake hand but felt on one’s real hand),
which violates the predictions of one’s
body-model about the unity of one’s body
(Hohwy, 2007). This conflict is resolved by
the brain by remapping modality-specific
body part-centered reference frames onto
each other (e.g., proprioception onto
vision), so that the multimodal represen-
tation of the body and the space sur-
rounding it remains coherent (Holmes and
Spence, 2004; Makin et al., 2008; Tsakiris,
2010; Blanke, 2012). Thereby the spatio-
temporal and anatomical constraints of
BOIs (touch needs to occur simultane-
ously at corresponding locations and on
a congruent body part in an anatomi-
cally plausible posture) suggest that mul-
tisensory input has to be compatible
with a prior representation of the body
(Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005; De Preester
and Tsakiris, 2009; Tsakiris, 2010; Moseley
et al., 2012). The brain seems to make a
probabilistic either-or decision based on
current sensory input under a prior body
model, which during BOIs results in the
replacement of the real body part by the
“owned” fake body part (Longo et al.,
2008; Moseley et al., 2012). And indeed,
the neural mechanisms integrating multi-
sensory information during the RHI may
be similarly employed for one’s real body
parts (Gentile et al., 2013). When the rub-
ber hand is threatened or injured, partici-
pants show behavioral, and neural anxiety
responses similar as for one’s real body
part (Ehrsson et al., 2007). BOIs may even
affect the regulation of one’s physiologi-
cal states: During illusory ownership, one’s
real limb’s temperature may be downreg-
ulated (Moseley et al., 2008), and even the
immune systemmay decrease “protection”
of the own limb (Barnsley et al., 2011;
Costantini, 2014). In sum, there is com-
pelling evidence that BOIs interfere with
the representation of one’s body. Upon
closer inspection, however, the fact that
BOIs isolate “the various components that
converge in the holistic experience of our
bodies” (Maselli and Slater, 2013) may be
a fundamental limitation when it comes to
relating them to MPS.
MANIPULATING (FEATURES OF) THE
SELF: UNDERSTANDING THE
IMPLICATIONS OF BODY OWNERSHIP
ILLUSIONS FOR MINIMAL
PHENOMENAL SELFHOOD
Phenomenological analysis has empha-
sized the paradox role of the body in our
experience (Legrand, 2010) as both an
“objective” body that is a physical thing
and thus part of the world, and a “sub-
jective” or “lived” body that is our means
of experiencing and interacting with the
world (this can be traced back to Husserl,
Merleau-Ponty, and arguably Sartre, see
Gallagher, 1986; Gallagher and Zahavi,
2010). Crucially, during interaction with
the world, we usually do not experi-
ence the lived body as a thing enabling
this interaction, and it may be this very
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“experiential absence” of the body that
gives us the feeling of “being there” in the
world (Gallagher, 1986; Metzinger, 2004).
Such a phenomenological distinction may
be of particular relevance for BOIs, which
isolate and manipulate, and direct atten-
tion to perceptual features of oneself such
as visual appearance or physical location.
In William James’ words, BOIs may inter-
fere with the “me” (i.e., the features that
one ascribes to oneself) but not the “I”
(the subject of experience) (James, 1890;
Christoff et al., 2011). Thus, the paradox
role of the bodymay be part of what makes
the interpretation of BOIs and their rela-
tion to MPS so difficult: When we speak of
body “ownership” in these paradigms, we
may only refer to self-identification with
the perceived body.
Although MPS can be broken
down into distinct features (e.g., self-
identification, self-location in space and
time, or a first-person perspective), it
is still one phenomenal property that
“does not have proper parts that could
themselves count as a kind or type of
self-consciousness” (Metzinger, 2013a,
2004). MPS thus acknowledges the
“global and unitary character of self-
consciousness” (Blanke and Metzinger,
2009). This unified character of MPS—
characterized by the fact that we cannot
introspectively access its underlying mech-
anisms and components—is what lends
our experience its phenomenal “real-
ness” (Metzinger, 2004, 2013a). As we
have recently argued (Limanowski and
Blankenburg, 2013), this MPS conceptu-
alization is elegantly compatible with a
theory of cortical information processing
based on predictive coding (Friston, 2010):
The free energy principle (FEP) postulates
that the brain implements a hierarchical
generative model of the world (includ-
ing the organism itself) that constantly
predicts the causes of its sensory input,
and that may be updated if its predic-
tions fail. Due to the model’s constant
bidirectional and hierarchical informa-
tion flow with the aim of reducing overall
prediction error, this model is spatially,
temporally, and phenomenally centered
onto the organism itself (Hohwy, 2007,
2013; Friston, 2011; Limanowski and
Blankenburg, 2013; Apps and Tsakiris,
2014). The FEP account, albeit mechanis-
tic in nature, thus acknowledges that one’s
self-representation is plastic (i.e., proba-
bilistic), hierarchical, and yet unified. It
builds upon existing neuropsychological
models of body ownership (e.g., Makin
et al., 2008; Tsakiris, 2010), and shares
key assumptions about being a self with
the MPS conceptualization—most impor-
tantly, that the phenomenal self is a result
of probabilistic self-modeling.
Thereby the MPS and FEP accounts
both emphasize that such probabilistic
self-modeling is a “risky business” for
the phenomenal self: When the cur-
rent generative model is abandoned in
favor of another model that fits the sen-
sory data better, the agent in its present
form—encoded as the model evidence of
the self-centered world-model—ceases to
exist (Friston, 2011). Luckily, this does
not need to happen: If prediction error
can be explained away at lower lev-
els, there is no need to adjust higher-
level predictions, let alone to abandon
the current world-model. In the case of
BOIs this means that if the probabilis-
tic representation of one’s physical fea-
tures can be updated to eliminate the
surprise originating from the ambiguous
sensory input, there is no need to aban-
don the actual self-model (Hohwy, 2013;
Limanowski and Blankenburg, 2013; Apps
and Tsakiris, 2014). Such an updating of
self-representations is demonstrated, for
example, by the increased perceived simi-
larity of the “owned” dummy hand (Longo
et al., 2009), and even of another face
(Tsakiris, 2008; Apps et al., 2013) to one-
self, or by the fact that the mere expecta-
tion of an upcoming touch on the dummy
hand may evoke a BOI (Ferri et al., 2013).
In this light, BOIs can be conceived
of as targeting specific inferential mech-
anism employed by the organism, thus
directly confirming the functional archi-
tecture suggested by probabilistic mod-
els of MPS—but this also opens up
some questions. It seems that BOIs pri-
marily affect mechanisms operating at
lower levels of self-modeling, because the
induced conflict can readily be resolved
without inducing panic or pathological
conditions, and because the recalibration
of one modality onto another relies on
relatively basic multisensory mechanisms
(Tsakiris, 2010; Blanke, 2012; Gentile et al.,
2013). On the other hand, the adjust-
ment of physiological responses (Ehrsson
et al., 2007; Moseley et al., 2008; Barnsley
et al., 2011) might imply that BOIs also
affect higher levels of the self-model (Seth,
2013). To understand the implications of
BOIs for MPS, it is crucial to identify
which levels of MPS they affect: When do
these illusions merely alter perceptual fea-
tures of oneself, and when—if at all—do
they in fact affect MPS per se?
Metzinger (2013a,b) has recently
clarified the MPS conceptualization by
introducing the term phenomenal unit
of identification (UI), “the phenomenal
property with which we currently identify,
exactly the form of currently active con-
scious content that generates the subjective
experience of ‘I am this”’ (2013b). As I take
it, the UI concept can be used in two ways:
It specifies the content with which the self-
model identifies—this self-identification
leads to the experience of MPS (Metzinger,
2004). Formally, we may think of the UI as
the evidence or the “origin” of the cur-
rent generative model (the “region of
maximal invariance,” Metzinger, 2013a;
see also Friston, 2011; Limanowski and
Blankenburg, 2013).
The important point is that the UI con-
cept may help to answer our question:
BOIs do affect MPS, just not in its entirety.
The resolution of BOI-evoked conflicts by
changing the representation of certain fea-
tures of oneself, despite attacking funda-
mental conditions of MPS, may not be
sufficient to change the UI. Even the exten-
sion of BOIs to the fully body—although
surely a step in the right direction—
does not necessarily imply a change in
the UI: For example, since FBIs seem
to employ the same multisensory mech-
anisms as the RHI (Petkova et al., 2011;
Maselli and Slater, 2013), it could be that
what becomes subject to the illusion is
actually not the whole body, but just the
stimulated part of the body (e.g., the torso
in the FBI, Smith, 2010; Metzinger, 2013a;
see Tsakiris et al., 2006, for such evidence).
More importantly, FBIs may also manipu-
late only individual features of one’s self-
representation such as one’s visual appear-
ance or physical location.
Interestingly, however, Metzinger
(2013a,b) proposes that the UImay change
during mind wandering episodes, bodiless
dreams, and some forms of out-of-body
experiences. The resulting claim that an
explicit body representation may actually
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not be required for MPS (Metzinger, ibd.)
is in line with the proposal that a core
self is present even when disconnected
from exteroceptive sensory input (e.g.,
during sleep, Park and Tallon-Baudry,
2014). Such proposals are inspiring, but
they also show that much work still
needs to be done to understand the
exact relation between the body, MPS,
and its UI. Probabilistic models follow-
ing the FEP offer a promising way of
formally describing the underlying self-
modeling mechanisms, but in addition,
new experimental approaches address-
ing specific levels of MPS are needed. To
avoid confusion, these approaches should
acknowledge the dual role of the body as
both subject and object of experience.
CONCLUSION
BOIs have proven an important tool for
understanding MPS. But one should keep
in mind that BOIs manipulate individ-
ual features of one’s self-representation,
and that this manipulation of certain
dimensions of MPS not necessarily affects
the UI. Nevertheless, if situated within a
phenomenologically inspired probabilistic
model, BOIs can contribute to our under-
standing ofMPS by clarifying its hierarchy,
and to further developing the UI concept
and its relation to the body. Whether we
can develop paradigms that manipulate
the UI to actually create the illusion of
being someone else is a different question,
but there are promising new developments
that encourage to pursue it.
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